ABSTRACT To avoid the drawbacks of a pricing mechanism in heterogeneous cloud environments that considers only single resources, we propose a multi-resource combinatorial pricing mechanism in this paper. This approach jointly considers the principal resources (i.e., CPU, memory, storage, and bandwidth) with the goal of minimizing the total cost. Then, a cost-optimized resource provisioning policy (CORPP) based on game theory is applied to this mechanism that considers the Nash equilibrium between cloud users as well as the Stackelberg equilibrium between users and the cloud provider. The experimental results show that the proposed combinatorial pricing mechanism is more suitable in a heterogeneous cloud environment when running various types of cloudlets. Moreover, CORPP is effective in reducing users' total costs when using both random cloudlets and PlanetLab cloudlets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a recent business model. With the development of smart computing environments, cloud computing can be considered as a natural improvement on parallel computing, distributed computing and grid computing. The resources at cloud service providers (CSP) owns are leased by different cloud users (CU), who can apply and release their cloud computing resources dynamically [1] - [3] . Because there are different types of cloudlets, the resources a task relies on are also vary. For example, a calculation task relies on a CPU more than on other resources, a matrix operation may focus primarily on memory, a cloud storage service depends on available storage and bandwidth resources, and so on.
Resource pricing is a foundational concern when studying a cloud computing provisioning policy. However, researchers have mostly considered only single-resource pricing mechanisms (i.e., for CPU, memory or network). For example, Li et al. [4] proposed a scheduling strategy to maximize the benefits of a CSP's network resources based on a network resource bidirectional auction mechanism in a federated selfish cloud environment. Many similarities exist between the cloud computing environment and the free market in economic theory; thus, many scholars have proposed methods based on market mechanisms to solve the cloud computing provisioning problem. Goiri et al. [5] proposed a federated cloud architecture for CSPs based on economics. Toosi et al. [6] proposed an approach to outsource or terminate cloud tasks to solve the problem of resource insufficiency during peak demand periods for virtual machines in a federated cloud environment. Moreover, most articles based on the market economy model focus on maximizing the benefits accrued by the CSP without considering the purchasing costs of CUs.
However, as mentioned before, the tasks executing on a computing platform rely on different resources. Consequently, a single-resource pricing mechanism has natural drawbacks: it can lead to higher costs for some CUs or cause unnecessary purchases. There are two possible reasons for this phenomenon: (1) multiple CUs can share cloud computing resources, but traditional resource provisioning policies do not consider the impact on CUs when using common resources; (2) existing studies based on market economy game theory do not consider the influence of CSP pricing strategy or resource provisioning policy change on CUs [7] , [8] .
Therefore, the sustainability of cloud computing system urgently requires a multi-dimensional resource pricing mechanism for heterogeneous cloud computing resources and a resource provisioning policy that simultaneously considers different CUs and the interplay between CUs and the CSP. In this paper, we propose a multi-dimensional resource combinatorial pricing mechanism that jointly considers the principal resources (i.e., CPU, memory, storage and bandwidth) with the goal of minimizing the total cost.
Furthermore, a cost-optimized resource provisioning policy (CORPP) in a heterogeneous cloud environment is defined based on game theory that maximizes system utility while minimizing the total cost to CUs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the resource pricing mechanism and provisioning policy and then analyze the game relations in CORPP in Section 3. The experiments and results are presented in Section 4, and final conclusions and future research directions are given in Section 5.
II. RESOURCE PRICING MECHANISM AND PROVISIONING POLICY A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In a cloud computing system, CUs submit resource requirements and different types of cloud tasks to a CSP. The cloud computing resource distributor consists of a pricing mechanism, a statistical mechanism, a task scheduler, and a virtual machine manager. The pricing mechanism sets the price for multi-dimensional combinations and is responsible for pricing different types of resources from different cloud servers. The pricing mechanism is responsible for recording each CU's purchases and the revenue generated by each cloud server. The task scheduler is responsible for scheduling different cloud tasks. CORPP includes two types of cloud tasks: (1) User tasks (those submitted by a CU); and (2) System tasks (those required to manage the normal operation of cloud computing system). Different tasks running on different cloud servers will affect a CU's purchasing costs. The virtual machine manager is responsible for dynamically creating, starting, suspending, and deleting virtual machines based on the CUs' resource requirements. A cloud data center is heterogeneous, containing a variety of different types of cloud servers that provide CPU, memory, storage, network bandwidth and other physical resources required to run the virtual machines. The structure of a cloud computing system is shown in Figure 1 .
The cloud task scenario we consider in this paper is as follows. Multiple CUs submit resource requests as well as cloud tasks to the CSP at the same time. During the duration of a lease period, all the cloud tasks from CUs can be completed. Thus, we can make the following three assumptions: (1) all the resource types in the system (e.g., CPU, memory, storage, and bandwidth) are independent; (2) The CSP has a sufficient number of resources to meet the resource requirements of all its CUs within a lease period; and (3) each CU behaves selfishly; the CSP wishes to retain its CUs by offering relatively low prices to improve its reputation in the cloud computing market and, thus, attract more CUs.
B. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL RESOURCES COMBINATORIAL PRICING MECHANISM
Assume that a heterogeneous cloud data center has m cloud servers, denoted as H = {H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H m }. The maximum CPU, memory, storage and bandwidth capacity of each server H i is defined as a vector
. . , U n } denotes n CUs all using the cloud computing resources simultaneously. The resource requirement of U is = (ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω n ) T , in which the CPU, memory, storage, and bandwidth requirements of U j are expressed as ω j = (cpu j , mem j , stge j , bw j ), respectively. For different types of cloud servers, the prices of different resource types vary; the multi-dimensional resource combinatorial pricing in this paper is accurate for the four resources of each cloud server. We define P(
as the combined price of CPU, memory, storage, and bandwidth for server H i .
C. COST-OPTIMIZED RESOURCE PROVISIONING POLICY (CORPP)
The global resource provisioning policy of a CSP is defined as = (φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ n ) T and determines the provisioning of CU's resources. In CORPP, φ j is the policy of U j
The total resources required by all CUs on server H i is denoted by
j , and is restricted to be no greater than the maximum capacity of the corresponding resources of RES i , i.e.,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The function set of the server's cost is defined as
in which F i (r i j ) represents the cost of U j using CPU, memory, storage, and bandwidth resources r i j on server H i , and the cost of all CUs generated on the server H i is denoted by F i (R i ). From the above definition we can see that for policy to be feasible, we must meet the following conditions:
Formula 3 represents the fact that the sum of all server resources assigned to U j should be equal to U j 's demand, i.e., ω j , and that the total demand on each resource should be limited to the maximum capacity of the corresponding resource of each server.
Then, the price that U j pays is the total cost of all the server resource U j uses, i.e.,
Here, ψ(i, j) = 1 when U j uses server H i ; conversely, ψ(i, j) = 0. Because Formula 4 presents the purchasing cost of U j , maximizing −UC (j) means that U j maximizes its utility function.
The cost of the entire cloud computing system is determined by the total costs TC of the global provisioning policy , i.e.,
Using the same logic, maximizing −TC means that we obtain the smallest total system cost.
III. GAME THEORY IN CORPP
Market economic game theory can be used to analyze the relationships between multiple CUs as well as the relationship between CUs and the CSP with the goal of finding the most suitable resource provisioning policy for the cloud computing system. The relationships in CORPP are shown in Figure 2 , where the CSPs are responsible for the cloud server and for selecting the CPU, memory, storage and bandwidth resources required to run the cloud computing system, and the CUs apply to use the required resources. Because the resources are shared by CUs, there is a competition between multiple CUs. Moreover, there is also a cost game between the CUs and the CSP.
A. GAME BETWEEN MULTIPLE CUs
In CORPP, a user U j adjusts its strategy selfishly; maximizing the utility function −U C (j) minimizes its own costs. However, because multiple CUs share cloud computing VOLUME 5, 2017 resources, this strategy increases the costs U C (k) of other U k (k = j). Because CUs are selfish, each CU tries to minimize its own purchasing costs; thus, the CUs continually change their strategies until they can no longer reduce the cost. This dynamic adjustment continues until the system reaches a stable state, i.e., no CU can reduce costs by changing its strategy unilaterally. This stable state is known as a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1: A feasible global resource provisioning policy = (φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ n ) T can be considered as having achieved Nash equilibrium when the following condition is met; this provisioning policy is named the Nash Provisioning policy.
If U j ∈ U , and for any other , we have UC (j) ≤ UC (j), and
In the Nash equilibrium state, no CU will change its current policy. However, although Nash equilibrium represents a stable state of the system, the total costs TC may not be optimal. To explore the best possible performance that can be achieved in CORPP, we define the cost-optimized problem as follows:
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Furthermore, Formula 6 can be re-written as follows:
According to Formula 2, we have
Which leads to the following theorem.
T is a convex function on R n . Proof: Let x, y ∈ R n and α ∈ [0, 1], then we have
Then, according to the definition of a convex function, we have proved this theorem. Therefore, the above nonlinear optimization problem is a convex programming problem, and any local optimal solution is a global optimal solution. Therefore, Formula 8 can be further rewritten as follows:
The representation method and the constraint conditions of TC are similar to the formula for solving the selfish routing [9] . One needs only to make the corresponding change: replacing the ''path'' in selfish routing in [9] with ''cloud users'' in CORPP, and using ''physical resources'' in CORPP to represent the ''side'' in [9] . Finally, to obtain the ''global resources provisioning policy'' in CORPP, we need to find the ''flow'' in [9] . Then, the equivalence between CORPP and selfish routing can be derived from their respective optimization formulas. When TC uses this equivalence, based on Theorem 3.2 in [9] , we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2: When the various resource cost functions of (H , F, ) are continuously non-decreasing, CORPP can reach the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the Nash provisioning policy of CORPP involves solving the following optimization problem to minimize TC under Constraint 7, in which the server cost function is 
B. GAME BETWEEN CUs AND CSP
To overcome the local optimal in Nash equilibrium for arbitrary cost functions, we consider a variant of the Nash equilibrium in CORPP, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium. In this case, the game includes two types of players: a leader, whose goal is to optimize the utility of the whole system, and a group of participants, who are selfish; each type attempts to maximize its own utility. The leader cannot directly determine the participants' strategies; however, the leader can influence the followers' strategies through his or her own strategy. Therefore, the leader wants to choose a strategy that causes the system to achieve an approximately optimal solution. Consequently, CORPP can be modeled after Stackelberg equilibrium, where the CSP plays the leader role and tries to maximize the system utility, while the CUs can be seen as the participants, who selfishly attempt to reduce their own purchasing costs.
We
. . , r m L ) T to represent the resource provisioning policy of the CSP (i.e., the leader's policy in the system), where r i L represents the CPU, memory, storage, and bandwidth resources used by the leader on server H i . The total amount of resources used by the leader is defined as
The Stackelberg global resource provisioning policy is defined as (φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ n , φ L ) T , the total amount of 
The complete provisioning policy is called the Nash-Stackelberg provisioning policy.
When the cost function assigned by the Stackelberg policy is the lowest, then the resource provisioning policy is optimal. For best performance, Stackelberg equilibrium relies on the leader's strategy; in other words, the leader's strategy also determines the system's performance. In this paper, we consider two kinds of leader strategies: the Aloof strategy and the Least Cost First (LCF) strategy [10] .
Aloof Strategy: In this strategy, the CSP ignores the CUs' strategies; instead, it tries to find a provisioning strategy for
In the Aloof strategy, the leader does not consider the followers' strategies; he determines the resource provisioning policy independently.
LCF Strategy: In the LCF strategy, the leader uses the resources that other clients tend to reject: those whose prices are higher. The following algorithm is used to find the LCF strategy.
1) The leader first solves Formula 6 to obtain the optimal provisioning policy * of CORPP (H , F, * ), recorded as * = (ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω n , ω L ) T . This allocation is not necessarily balanced for CUs; that is, some U j may reduce their costs by changing their strategies. 2) Sort the resources to make F 1 ( * (1)) ≤ F 2 ( * (2)) ≤ ... ≤ F m ( * (m)) and find the smallest i * , so that m i=i * * (i) ≤ ω L . Here, * (i) represents the resources that the optimal provisioning policy * allocates on server H i .
3) The leader's strategy
k < k * In the LCF strategy, the leader adopts the (m − k * ) servers with the highest costs, which induces the followers to achieve Nash equilibrium. According to Theorem 4.2 in [10] , the following conclusions can be obtained. When S L is the LCF strategy of CORPP (H , F, )'s leader, which includes one method that provides S L for the followers' Nash and another one providing * for the CORPP (H , F, )'s optimum, then
α CT * , where α represents the proportion that the leader's tasks account for of the entire system task. This indicates that the worst case for the LCF policy is 1 α times the optimal provisioning policy.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS

A. EXPERIMENT CONFIGURATION
The proposed CORPP algorithm is implemented on the CloudSim 3.0.3 platform [11] . The experiment simulates four types of virtual machines commonly used by Amazon EC2, namely, H-VM, E-VM, S-VM and M-VM, whose configurations are shown in Table 1 . The cloud data center has 100 servers; 50 are HP ProLiant ML110 G4s, and the others are G5s. The G4s are configured with a Xeon-3040 @ 1860 MHz, 2 cores, and 4 GB of RAM, while the G5s contain a Xeon-3075 @ 2660 MHz, 2 cores, and 4 GB of RAM.
Our experiments use two types of cloud tasks: CPU-intensive tasks and PlanetLab tasks that can be considered as network I/O-intensive tasks [12] , [13] . The experimental simulation cycle is 24 h; for all cloud tasks, the MIPS range is between 2.0 * 10 7 and 4.0 * 10 7 .
B. RESULTS ANALYSIS
The experiment first compares the difference between a CPU-pricing mechanism and the combinatorial pricing mechanism with different types of virtual machines and different quantities of CUs when running either CPU intensive tasks or network I/O-intensive tasks. When the ratio between the CPU-pricing result and the combinatorial pricing result is sufficiently high (which we define as 60%), we say the CPUpricing mechanism is sufficient because CPU pricing plays a prime role, and the single-resource pricing mechanism is much simpler than the combinatorial pricing mechanism. The experiments are run several times and the average is taken as the result. Figure 3 shows the total costs of the two pricing mechanisms when employed with different numbers of users and four types of virtual machines running CPU-intensive tasks. When using M-VM with the lower CPU configuration, the total cost based on CPU pricing is approximately 42% of the total cost based on combinatorial pricing. But as the CPU configuration in the virtual machines improves (i.e., when using S-VM, E-VM or H-VM), the proportion of the total costs based on the CPU to the total costs based on combinatorial pricing gradually increases, from 60%, to 73%, and finally, to 78%, respectively. This result indicates that when the cloud task is using more powerful CPU configurations such as H-VM, it is reasonable to use the CPU-pricing mechanism as the pricing method. In contrast, when using a less-powerful CPU configuration such as M-VM, the prices under this single-resource mechanism are less than half the total costs generated by the combinatorial pricing. This result shows that CPU cannot be the only condition considered by a pricing strategy.
Similar scenarios occur in Figure 4 , in which network I/O-intensive tasks are being executed. The ratios between the CPU-pricing results and the combinatorial pricing results are 35%, 47%, 51%, and 40% when using M-VM, S-VM, E-VM, and H-VM configurations, respectively. This result indicates that the single CPU-pricing mechanism is completely unsuitable for pricing network I/O-intensive tasks.
From the above analysis, the CPU-pricing mechanism considers only one resource; consequently, it may be suitable for CPU-intensive tasks, but cannot be applied to other types of tasks, such as I/O-intensive tasks. Therefore, the multi-dimensional resource combinatorial pricing mechanism based on the CPU, memory, storage and network bandwidth and proposed in this paper is more suitable for pricing cloud computing resources.
For our combinatorial pricing mechanism experiments, we executed randomly generated tasks and PlanetLab cloud tasks and then compared the total costs using four resource provisioning policies: the optimal provisioning policy, Nash provisioning policy, Nash-Stackelberg provisioning policy and Round-Robin policy. Moreover, we compared the highest income obtained by a single cloud server under these four policies. Among these four resource provisioning policies, the first three are based on game theory, where the optimal provisioning policy is theoretically optimal, while the leader in the Nash-Stackelberg provisioning policy uses the LCF strategy, with α = 0.1. The last policy, Round-Robin, is not a game-based policy. Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively show the total costs and highest income of a single server with randomly generated tasks generated by four different provisioning policies under the combinatorial pricing mechanism. From Figure 5 , the highest total cost is generated by the Round-Robin provisioning policy, while the results from the Nash and NashStackelberg provisioning policies are both close to the cost of the optimal provisioning policy. Compared to the costs of the Round-Robin provisioning policy, the other three results average 22% lower. Figure 6) shows that the highest costs obtained by a single cloud server are very close to each other among the last three policies, but under the RoundRobin policy, the results can be 2 times those of the other three policies. This result shows that in the Round-Robin provisioning policy, CUs cannot obtain the resources at a lower price on this cloud server, resulting in an increase in the purchasing cost. This result may occur because of the pricing differences of heterogeneous cloud resources and the selfish characteristics of CUs. In addition, the Round-Robin provisioning policy does not consider the games between the CUs, or the CUs and the CSP.
The results of the above experiments with PlanetLab cloud tasks are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 . From Figure 7 , the total costs of Round-Robin provisioning policy are much higher than those of the other three policies; in the worst case, the Round-Robin provisioning policy result is approximately 2.6 times as large as the optimal provisioning policy result. However, the total costs obtained by Nash provisioning policy and Nash-Stackelberg provisioning policy are close to the optimal provisioning policy result, and they average 54% below the Round-Robin provisioning policy costs. Similar to Figure 6 , Figure 8 shows the highest income from a single cloud server under different resource provisioning policies and number of CUs when running PlanetLab cloud tasks. These results show that the proposed provisioning policy based on a multi-dimensional pricing mechanism is also applicable to real tasks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study, we first designed a multi-dimensional resource pricing mechanism for heterogeneous cloud computing systems that overcomes the drawback of single resource pricing mechanisms, which are unsuitable for the diversity of cloud computing tasks. Then, we proposed a cost-optimized resource provisioning policy (CORPP) based on game theory, which considers interactions between the CUs and between the CUs and the CSP to avoid unnecessarily high costs. In these games, CORPP simultaneously considers the existence of Nash equilibrium between the CUs, and Stackelberg equilibrium between the CUs and the CSP.
The experimental results showed multi-dimensional resource combinatorial pricing mechanism is more suitable for describing a real cloud environment executing various types of cloud tasks. For both randomly generated cloud tasks or actual PlanetLab cloud tasks, CORPP reduced the total costs of all CUs efficiently compared to the existing Round-Robin strategy. Future work should focus on strategies that include games between multiple CSPs or on other heterogeneous cloud data centers objectives, such as saving energy. 
